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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

KATE STITH*
The title of our panel is, “Where We Are and How we Got Here.” My task
is to explain “how we got here,” while the rest of the panel will explore where
we are—that is, how well or poorly the federal guidelines system is working.
The last panel of the day, of course, is “Where Should We Go From Here?”
Inevitably, that question is going to be addressed, explicitly or implicitly,
throughout the day.
Senator Kennedy introduced in 1977 the bill that would become the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.1 Its intellectual progenitor was Marvin E.
Frankel, a distinguished federal judge in New York, who, in the early 1970s,
had written a scathing attack on judicial sentencing discretion.2 Frankel and
other liberal reformers conceived of this first version of the Sentencing Reform
Act as an anti-imprisonment and anti-discrimination measure. An adjunct to
federal criminal code reform, the 1977 bill directed sentencing authorities to
consider mitigating or aggravating personal characteristics of the defendant,
encouraged alternatives to imprisonment, and recognized significant judicial
discretion to depart from administrative sentencing guidelines.3
Senator Kennedy reintroduced his bill in each of the next four Congresses.4
As the mood and concerns of the country changed, so did the provisions of this
bill. Senator Strom Thurman became a co-sponsor and later on so did Senators
Hatch and Biden.5 The bill was ultimately enacted in 1984 as part of an

* Kate Stith is the Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law at Yale Law School, where she teaches
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, and courses on Congress and the
Legislative Process. She is also Deputy Dean of the Law School. After Dartmouth College, the
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Law School, and clerkships with Judge Carol
McGowan of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and Justice Byron R. White of the United
States Supreme Court, she served as a federal prosecutor in the Justice Department and in the
Southern District of New York. Professor Stith is president of the Connecticut Bar Foundation,
and vice-chair of the Dartmouth College Board of Trustees. She is the principal author of the first
book-length study of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, published ten years after they came into
effect: Fear of Judging Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts (1998).
1. S. 1437, 95th CONG., 1st SESS. (1977).
2. See generally MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(1973).
3. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 237-51 (1993).
4. Id. at 257-66.
5. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, S. 1762 (98th Cong., 2nd Sess.), Pub. L. No. 98-473,
98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
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important criminal measure which included, in other provisions, significant
mandatory minimum statutory sentences. Over the course of the four
Congresses, the sources of plasticity in the early bill dissipated.
Whatever the early proponents of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines may
have expected, the ultimate sponsors of the legislation clearly desired
guidelines that were largely binding and sentences that were harsher than past
practice. Many provisions of the statutes strongly encouraged certain policy
choices that the first Sentencing Commission made, including its deviation
from past sentencing practice for most crimes and its determination to issue
detailed guidelines.
Since this conference will also consider state sentencing guidelines, it is
worth mentioning that the transformation of Senator Kennedy’s bill on the
federal level is similar to what happened to state criminal justice legislation
during these years. One political scientist who studied several states including
California and Illinois, described the evolution of sentencing bills during this
time as follows: “Due process liberals” initially sought to entice “law and
order conservatives” to join with them on the theory that conservatives were
equally dissatisfied with the regime of sentencing discretion, albeit for
different reasons. 6
The enticement worked, compromises were made, and in the end, the
liberals were hoisted on their own petard. The new sentencing regimes were
more responsive to a concern with overly lenient sentences by soft-hearted
judges than they were to due process concerns or overall sentencing
disparaties. Whatever one’s view of the wisdom of the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, the guidelines that were promulgated in 1987, which continue in their
essential structure today, are generally consistent with the terms of that statute
and with its legislative history.
At the same time, however, the Sentencing Reform Act could have been
implemented differently. Today’s newly appointed Commission has statutory
authority to implement the Sentencing Reform Act with less rigidity, less
complexity, and a significantly larger nod to the exercise of guided judicial
discretion supplemented with appellate review.7 Specifically, the Commission
is not statutorily compelled (1) to implement such an expansive concept of
“real offense” sentencing, (2) to incorporate statutory, mandatory minimum
sentences in the way that the current guidelines do, or (3) to require a motion
from the government before a court may depart downward for substantial
assistance to law enforcement authorities.8 And, certainly, the Commission is

6. See Jonathan D. Casper, Determinate Sentencing and Prison Crowding in Illinois, 1984
U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 236-37; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CALIFORNIA DETERMINANT SENTENCING LAW 24, 29, 31, 45-46 (May 1982).
7. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1999).
8. See id.
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not required to proclaim that most individual characteristics of defendants are
largely irrelevant to sentencing.9
Having recounted, however briefly, “how we got here,” let me end my
initial remarks by describing in very general terms some broader and important
features of the Guidelines.
It seems to me there are three fundamental characteristics of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines which, when taken together, are of great significance
not just for criminal sentencing but for the entire system of federal criminal
law.
First, we have to understand that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not
in any sense advisory. They are binding, mandatory rules which may be
departed from only pursuant to the rules themselves.
Second, these rules are not determined by elected representatives through
the process of legislation, but instead are promulgated by a central bureaucratic
agency.
Third, the rules take into account an enormously wide variety of criminal
conduct beyond the statutory elements of the offense of conviction.
Putting these three features together means that the Guidelines effectively
operate as a criminal code in their own right, supplementing statutory criminal
prohibitions. This is a significant change in our common-law tradition.
There are two especially striking aspects of this criminal code, as opposed
to the federal criminal law of the proceeding 200 years. First, this code is
remarkably complex. As a practical matter, I wonder whether much of the
complexity and detail of the Guidelines is necessary or helpful to the
participants in criminal sentencing.
Second, this code is, formally at least, a closed system. I suspect that
actual criminal sentencing is far more porous than the Guidelines would admit.
Surely the Guidelines do not openly acknowledge the extent to which the
formal demands of law are inevitably tempered in implementation. I venture
to hypothesize that in many cases, in many districts of the country, the formal
requirements of the Guidelines are met only on paper, not in reality, because to
a large extent the Guidelines have driven underground the adversarial
bargaining process and sentencing judges’ own efforts to ensure a just
sentence.
I hope that the new Commission will thoughtfully reconsider both the
complexity and the rigidity of the present Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The

9. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1994)(stating that the Sentencing Commission may consider
age, education, vocational skill, mental and emotional condition, physical condition, employment
record, family ties, part played in the crime, criminal history, and “degree of dependence upon
criminal activity for a livelihood” in establishing categories of defendants for sentencing
purposes).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

390

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:387

rule of law cannot prevail unless it is open to the possibility of correction,
adjustment, and more complete justice.

